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T

he Canadian War Museum,
the national military history
museum, is a living memorial
to those men and women who
served in Canada’s armed forces.
It is also a centre for research and
dissemination of infor-mation
and expertise on all aspects
of the country’s military past
from pre - contact era to the
present. It preserves the artifacts
of Canadian military experience,

interprets them for present
and future generations, and
advances the professional
study of Canadian military
history, including the effects
of war and conflict on the
nation and all its citizens.
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Please make cheques and
money orders payable to
“Wilfrid Laurier University.”
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The Laurier Centre for Military
Strategic and Disarmament Studies

T

he purpose of the Laurier Centre for Military Strategic and
Disarmament Studies (LCMSDS) is to foster research,
teaching, and public discussion of military and strategic issues of
national and international significance. The Centre is intentionally
multi-disciplinary; it has strong commitments in military history,
with emphasis on the Canadian experience, and in strategic and
operational studies, with emphasis on disarmament. LCMSDS
supports both basic and applied research as well as teaching at
the undergraduate and graduate levels. In addition, the extensive
program of LCMSDS workshops, conferences, public lectures,
and publications encourages informed discussion of international
security and of Canada’s national interests in military and strategic
issues - past, present and future.
The Laurier Centre for Military Strategic and Disarmament
Studies was founded in 1991 as a Research Centre affiliated with
Wilfrid Laurier University. Its primary support has come from
the Department of National Defence and from Wilfrid Laurier
University. The Director of the Centre is Professor Terry Copp,
Professor of History.
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From the Editor-in-Chief

M

arc Milner of the University of New
Brunswick, although best known for his
work on the navy, has for many years also been a
leader in battlefield study tours, particularly the
Canadian battlefields in Europe. His many treks
through Normandy, stimulated by the questions
and insights of generations of young and not-soyoung students, inspired his current research on
the role of the Royal Canadian Artillery. Marc was
also prompted to write this article as his father
served in 13th Field Regiment during these early
bridgehead battles. The “Guns of Bretteville” is
a substantial addition to our knowledge of this
period of the Normandy campaign.
Andrew Iarocci provides another view of the
Royal Canadian Artillery in Northwest Europe
with a paper on the Canadian designed and
produced Sexton self-propelled gun and its
employment by the 23rd Field Regiment. Andrew
recently joined the Canadian War Museum history
team on a fellowship to carry out research on
vehicles in the museum’s collection; the present
article grew directly from this assignment.
Continuing with the theme of self-propelled
artillery is an account by Wesley M. Alkenbrack, a
D-Day veteran of 14th Field Regiment, who writes
of the destruction three SP guns of his unit on 6
June.
Laura Brandon, the art historian at the
museum, has continued her important, if sad,
mission, of noting the passing of each artist of
the Canadian forces’ official art program of the
Second World War. Patrick G. Cowley-Brown
recorded the far-flung home stations of the Royal
Canadian Air Force. Aside from capturing the
vast but often little-known home operations of
the air force, he also vividly portrayed dramatic
landscapes at the very fringes of the country.
Part of the journal’s present mission is to
strengthen coverage of early Canadian military
history and of current missions and issues as
well. John Grodzinski of the Royal Military
College of Canada questions the British Army’s
reputation for savage discipline during the era of
the War of 1812, while showing that the ostensibly
more democratic and humane US Army of that
same period more readily inflicted the death
penalty on its members.

Bernd Horn and Bill Bentley, both members
of the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, have
collaborated to produce a strongly argued piece
on the historical context of their current work at
the institute. Tony Balasevicius and Greg Smith,
both serving infantry officers in the Canadian
Forces (CF), have also thought deeply about the
background to current challenges facing the CF,
in this case lessons that can be learned from the
experiences of the Soviet forces in Afghanistan
in the 1980s.
An addition to this issue of CMH is the
introduction of a column on web resources. Ken
Reynolds, an historian with the Department of
National Defence, writes about the Commonwealth
War Graves Commission website. Ken will
contribute future columns about websites of
relevance to the readers of CMH.
This issue marks an important landmark. It
is the last for which Cameron Pulsifer will serve
as the CWM editor. He took up that role with our
very first issue in 1992. Cam, as I have recently
remarked on this page, has been a leader in the
development of professional research standards
for the museum’s collections and has brought
that leadership in material history to our pages.
Cam has now retired from the museum after a
career of some 30 years at Queen’s University,
Parks Canada, and the Canadian Museum of
Civilization as well as CWM. We, of course,
look forward to the future contributions Cam
can make now that he has joined the leisured
classes.
Roger Sarty
Editor-in-Chief
November 2007
The editors of Canadian Military History wish to
thank the following people and organizations for their
contributions to this issue:
Maggie Arbour-Doucette, Brandey Barton, Mark
Humphries, Kellen Kurschinski, Lianne Leddy, Christine
Leppard, Vanessa McMackin, Susan Ross, Matt Symes,
Andrew Thomson, Jane Whalen.
Canadian Forces Joint Imagery Centre; Canadian War
Museum; Directorate of History & Heritage, Department
of National Defence; Security and Defence Forum,
Department of National Defence; Library and Archives
Canada; Wilfrid Laurier University.
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Dear sir,
here is a tendency in
the Canadian military
history tradition - witnessed
particularly in transcribers of
regimental histories – to zeroin on low-level Canadian army
attacks where casualties were
high or the objective was not
gained. “Slaughter” is a term
often used by writers capturing
the concerns of the veterans
as to why an attack was not
stopped. While understandable
in the micro-world for which
regimental histories are
recorded, in the macro-world
of global conflict, this is naive
at best. When former company,
battalion, brigade or divisional
commanders are asked “Why?”
the answer is often recorded as
“I had my orders” or “One has
to obey orders.” Years after the
events, the reader or listener
is left with the impression that
these commanders were simply
“automatons” blindly following
orders (this was after all the Nazi
excuse). But is this the case? Or
is it simply that the listener/
reader does not comprehend
what was meant? The former
commander being interviewed
either believes the regimental
historian understands what he
is saying, or that the radio/TV
interviewer does not - never
will - and there is no way that
he is going to be able to explain
“it” to this person, particularly
years after the fact! Hence
the response: “Well, I had my
orders!”
Shades of this come across
in “Trial by Fire” where Chris
Case examines the leadership
of Major-General Chris Vokes.
Other writers have wondered
why Vokes did not call a halt
to the attacks around Ortona
and Mr. Case does a good job
of explaining this. On the other

T

hand, in a Canadian context, it
is often asked: “Why did MajorGeneral Roberts halt his 11th
(BR) Armoured Division in
Antwerpen on September 4th,
1944?” Had he carried on to
Breda a great many Canadian
lives would have been spared
in late 1944 fighting to clear
the Scheldt and open the port.
Perhaps he too had his orders,
and had gone as far as he
could.
What does a commander
really mean by: “I had my orders!”
At any level - be it section,
platoon, company, battalion,
brigade, division, corps or
army - a commander will know
the objectives of all his “peer”
commanders, is fully conscious
of his immediate superiors
“plan” (into which his part fits),
and will have an understanding
of how the higher level plan is
expected to unfold. That the
average “infanteer” (recorded
in regimental histories) does

not know this should come
as no surprise – a soldier’s
view is a very narrow one in
terms of both time and space.
Particularly at the Captain and
higher level, a commander will
have the opportunity to ask if
something that bothers him
has been considered or taken
account of. He may even be able
to offer an alternative approach
to achieve his assigned task, but
he implicitly understands that
he can’t change his objective,
because “his objective” is only a
small part of a larger objective.
He also fully understands the
consequences of his men not
carrying out their task according
to the plan - by not achieving
their objective, others will die!
Additionally, he appreciates
that the staff have devoted
their time, and have used their
expertise and experience to
ensure the plan is feasible well
before the “Orders” are issued.
Nevertheless, no plan is ever
perfect! And things rarely, if
ever, unfold according to plan
for the reasons explained in the
article.
Nevertheless, once the final
decision is made and the “Order”
given, a subordinate commander
is faced with one of two options:
carry out the Order, or refuse
and suffer the consequences
- one of which is that someone
else will lead your men into
battle (and probably get them
killed). Because the mission
will go ahead, due to the simple
fact that it is a small part of
something bigger - particularly
in a Canadian context usually
much bigger! Few, if any, writers
or interviewers convey this “fact”
of military operations, and
military historians perhaps tend
to take this understanding for
continued on page 72…
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